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The purpose of this essay is to show the dramatic shifts that the Spanish-US
relationship has undergone from 2002 to date, by trying to explain their causes,
implications, and consequences. The following text offers a critical vision of Spanish
foreign policy in the last four years and suggests some possibilities to redefine the
current relationship with the US Government in a more constructive way.
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY
The international landscape between 2002 and 2006 has been particularly
intense and convulsive. According to this unstable and unpredictable scenario,
Spanish foreign policy, and particularly the relationship of Spain with the US, has
undergone a series of dramatic changes.
From 2002 until 2004, the relationship between Spain and the United States was
at its strongest in history; the Atlantic Summit, held in the Portuguese Azores Islands
on March 16, 2003, in the framework of the Iraqi crisis, demonstrated this fact.1 The
dynamics of the relationship began to change drastically when the Socialist Party
(PSOE) won the last general elections on March 14, 2004, from which time no
meetings have taken place between the current Spanish prime minister, José Luis
Rodríguez Zapatero, and the US president. This trend seems likely to continue for
the next two years, a contrast to Prime Minister José María Aznar’s last two years in
office, during which several meetings took place with President Bush; as such,
Rodríguez Zapatero might be the first Spanish prime minister who has not had any
summit with an American president in the last thirty years. Obviously, such a radical
shift between two consecutive administrations demands an analysis that attempts to
explain the wide range of factors that have caused this swing.
Before discussing the changes that occurred within the last four years, it is useful
to highlight the most recent history of Spanish foreign policy, namely focusing on
the Spanish-American relationship in the last twenty-five years.2
Until the beginning of 2002, it is possible to assert that there was a basic
agreement between the main political parties of Spain, the Popular Party, and the
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Socialist Party, concerning the main tenets of Spanish foreign policy. The September
11 terrorist attacks brought together the Spanish government and the opposition to
discuss the necessity of the war in Afghanistan, under the protection of the right to
self-defence, as proclaimed in the UN Charter. With several relevant nuances,
Aznar’s foreign policy generally remained constant until 2002, and the main grounds
of his predecessor, Felipe González, sustained his foreign policy from 1982 to1996.
Since 1986, the foreign policy of Spain has been based on four pillars: the
European, the Latin American, the South-Mediterranean, and the Atlantic.3 In fact,
in 1986, the standard that foreign policy would be based on political consensus was
crystallized; Spain became a member of the European Community, and the Spanish
population decided to remain in NATO by means of a national referendum.
1976 to 1986 are considered the formative years in democratic Spanish foreign
policy, as a process of defining the national interests within the international
framework was underway.4
The most controversial point of contention between the Spanish political
parties was Spain’s membership in NATO, which was strongly opposed by the
Socialist and the Communist Parties.5 In fact, Spain joined NATO in 1981 against
the opinion of the left-wing parties, although it did not become a member of the
Atlantic Alliance military structure.6 The main reason for this social and political
division was the anti-American sentiment generated by the continuous American
support of the Dictatorship of General Francisco Franco for almost 20 years.7
Aznar probably thought of the Iraqi crisis as a unique
opportunity to improve Spain’s relationship with the US to
the highest possible level, and thus, achieve an
international status of great power.
During the electoral campaign of 1982, the Socialist Party called for a
referendum to decide Spain’s future in NATO. Once elected, the Socialist prime
minister, Felipe González, began to shift his original position on NATO, and in a
risky political maneuver that carried out its electoral compromise, the Spanish
government asked for the favorable vote in order to keep Spain in NATO; the
government won its daring wager. González understood that withdrawing from the
Atlantic Alliance would have hindered the international insertion process of Spain.8
The leader of the Socialist Party realized that leaving NATO would have damaged
Spain’s credibility within the international community, including the potential for
joining the European Community.
The most resounding example of this political reversal, is Javier Solana, current
High Representative for the Common Foreign Security Policy of the European
Union, an ardent opponent of NATO at the beginning of the 1980’s, who became
NATO Secretary General ten years later. The statesmanship of Gonzalez’s
government, which envisioned foreign policy as a politique d’Etat, made possible the
birth of a national consensus with the main opposition party. Since then, Spanish
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foreign policy has been based upon the Atlantic pillar, and the values shared by the
main political parties of the country. The 1988 military-defensive agreements
between Spain and the US confirmed a new period of understanding in the bilateral
relationship, leaving behind the American relationship with Franco’s regime.9
Political consensus was forged slowly and arduously between the two main
political parties of Spain, but it was achieved and upheld for sixteen years, creating
stability and cohesion for Spanish foreign policy.
THE LAST TWO YEARS OF JOSÉ MARÍA AZNAR’S SECOND TERM
(2002–2004): A BREAK-UP IN SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY
Bush and Aznar continue to have an excellent personal relationship, but more
importantly, they also share a deep ideological agreement; Aznar shares Bush’s
unipolar vision of the world, asserting the necessity and the intrinsic goodness of a
hegemonic US foreign policy.10 Therefore, based on this iron belief of unipolarity,
Aznar decided to give an absolute priority to the bilateral relationship with the US
over any another political consideration.
According to Aznar, the new international scenario required an unshakeable
adherence to Washington’s positions. In this respect, the most controversial issue
enhancing Atlanticism was Spain’s support of the war in Iraq. It is necessary to take
into account that Spanish public opinion was overwhelmingly against the war in
Iraq.11 Although most Spaniards believed that Saddam Hussein’s regime had ties with
terrorist networks and that it possessed WMD, almost the 90 percent—according to
several polls—was strongly opposed to a US attack even if the military intervention
was supported by the UN Security Council.12 The cause of this mass popular
opinion against the Iraq war lies on the fact that the Spanish society is deeply
pacifist,13 an issue that Aznar did not appreciate enough in making his decision.14
During the management of the Iraqi crisis at the UN Security Council, Aznar
and Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister Ana Palacio—currently Senior Vice President
and World Bank Group General Counsel—played an active role in supporting and
promoting the US position. The Spanish prime minister travelled from the US to
Mexico and Chile in order to persuade Mexican President Vicente Fox and Chilean
President Ricardo Lagos to support a new UN Security Council resolution which
would have authorized the express use of force in Iraq; nonetheless, these attempts
were unsuccessful. Due to these trips to Mexico City and Santiago, Aznar lost the
relative autonomy that had characterized the Spanish–Latin American relationship in
the last twenty-five years.15
Aznar and Palacio tirelessly maintained that a new resolution was not necessary
from a juridical point of view, and that it was only politically desirable.16 The Spanish
government, like the governments of the US and Great Britain, obstinately defended
that Security Council resolution 1441, passed in October, 2002, was enough to justify
the use of force against Iraq in accordance to the UN Charter. Yet, this opinion
contradicted the reports of the head of the international legal department of the
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, who warned the Government on the necessity
of achieving an express Security Council authorization to legally use force against
Saddam’s regime.17 Moreover, the Spanish Association of Professors of
International Law and International Relations (AEPDIRI) showed an unusual
cohesion by publicizing a manifest against the use of force in Iraq on the basis of
resolution 1441.18 Indeed, the Spanish internationalists almost unanimously
denounced the illegal military action against Iraq as a violation of the UN Charter
Article 2 (4). The debate concerning the legality of the war in Iraq seemed to close,
once and for all, with the declaration of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who a
year after the invasion, recognized that the war was not under the protection of
international law.19
There were strong arguments in Spain for the reasons why the Spanish
government supported the war.20 From a realist point of view, the national interests
of Spain were not at all in danger. Several authors point out that support of the
invasion was the clear culmination of the Atlantistic vision that Aznar began to
develop in 1996,21 though this opinion is subject to argument. It is true that Aznar’s
foreign policy focused more on Atlanticism than the former cabinet had, but Aznar
always worked within the framework of the bipartisan consensus with the Socialist
Party. For example, the integration of Spain into the military structure of NATO in
1998 was supported by the Socialist Party.22 Therefore, the support of the Iraqi war
cannot be considered a culmination of a process, but a radical change of the general
principles that have inspired Spanish foreign policy since 1986.
Spain was a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council from
2003 until 2005, which could explain the high political role the Spanish government
played during the Iraqi crisis. Yet, this objective fact is not enough to explain the
protagonist profile that Aznar decided to assume in supporting the attack and the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.23 In fact, it is difficult to understand why
Aznar wanted to be in the political forefront while other European leaders, such as
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, remained in a more discreet and less risky
position.24 As we are going to see, only strong personal convictions based on
ideological reasons can explain this decision.25
Aznar probably thought of the Iraqi crisis as a unique opportunity to improve
Spain’s relationship with the US to the highest possible level, and thus, achieve an
international status of great power.26 Nonetheless, it is quite possible that Aznar
supported the Iraq war, not only because of pragmatic reasons, such as sharing great
power status with the US, but primarily because of ideological principles. In this
sense, the neoconservative thinking was the ideological basis of his policy decisions.
As in the US, the Spanish prime minister assumed the viewpoints of his
neoconservative advisers, especially those of Rafael L. Bardají—current Director of
International Politics at FAES, a Popular Party think tank—and his personal friend,
William Kristol.27 Bardají is regarded as the most influential neoconservative
ideologist in Spain.28 During the Iraqi crisis he played an important role supporting
116
SPANISH-US RELATIONS 
Summer/Fall 2007
the military action as Deputy Director of the Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios
Internacionales y Estratégicos, a Spanish think tank of international affairs financed by
public and private funds.29 Bardají had been an advisor of the Minister of Defence
for four years until he began to work for the Real Instituto Elcano in 2002. In March
2004, he decided to resign after the electoral victory of the Socialist Party.
Likewise, one has to highlight that Aznar supported the war using exactly the
same arguments provided by the US and Great Britain, without having his own
sources of intelligence. Through an uncritical alignment, he continuously asserted
that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed an imminent danger for international security
because of its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction and its ties with
al Qaeda.30
Moreover, supporting the war on Iraq was a personal decision made by Prime
Minister Aznar because he decided to carry out this radical change in Spanish foreign
policy without consulting the Parliament, government, or even his own party. As
Aznar recognized in his memoirs, he made the final decision that was assumed later
by the government and his own party,31 that is to say, a reverse decision-making
process according to the exceptional seriousness of the situation.32
The radical shift initiated by Aznar consisted of giving preference to the
privileged relationship with the US, over the inherent European orientation of Spain.
Aznar’s preference broke the balance between the European and Atlantic pillars of
Spanish foreign policy. In this respect, in October, 2003, Aznar impelled the Spanish
version of the September, 2002 National Security Strategy of the US. In an official
speech before the Spanish Military Academy (ESFAS), he spoke of the necessity of
preventive actions in order to defeat current national and international security
threats, namely the connection of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction.33
Likewise, Aznar asserted his predisposition to collaborate with the coalitions-of-the-
willing, led by the US.34 Only a few months before legislative elections, Aznar wanted
to proclaim a strategic thinking very close to the unilateral style of the American
NSS, with a notable neoconservative influence.35
The strategy stated by Aznar did not take into account the European Security
Strategy.36 The so-called “Solana Document” allows us to distinguish the different
perceptions of international threats and their response between Europe and the US.
As a remarkable example of these divergences, the European prescription for
conflict prevention can be highlighted in contrast to the American prescription for
pre-emptive, more precisely preventive, actions.37 Between the EU Strategic
Document and the American NSS, Aznar chose the latter. In his speech, Aznar made
it clear that the US was the most important ally of Spain, above the EU itself,
insinuating also that the US unilateral use of force was above the authority of the
UN Security Council.38
Following his own personalistic style that characterized his last two years in
office, Aznar made this important change of strategic doctrine, without even
informing the Parliament. The Aznar Doctrine was completely rejected by all the
political parties of the Spanish opposition who denounced his lack of dialogue and
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debate with the government concerning vital affairs of the state, such as foreign and
defence policies.
After leaving the government, Aznar’s public speeches and contributions to the
Wall Street Journal offer a better insight into his foreign policy decisions than his time
as prime minister.39 Therefore, his conferences at Georgetown University, as an
honorary professor,40 at the American Enterprise Institute,41 and at the Hudson
Institute,42 reveal a strong neoconservative influence in his political thinking, which
is now even easier to perceive than during the 2002–2004 period. In these speeches,
he has constantly supported the policies of the Bush administration, especially the
war on terrorism. Regardless of the false pretexts against Saddam’s regime, and the
disastrous situation in Iraq, he has always asserted that the American strategy is on
the right path. Like his friend President Bush, Aznar strongly believes that Iraq, the
region, and the world are now safer without Saddam Hussein.43 He also believes that
the main obstacle against the effectiveness of the war on terror is the lack of
cohesion among western countries, accusing several European leaders of not
believing in the West.44. In this sense, Aznar thinks that western values are the best
in the world, and, therefore, they must be energically defended and exported, though
he acknowledges that, unfortunately, this is not a common viewpoint in Europe.45
Likewise, Aznar believes that western civilization is in danger from Islamic
radicalism, as it was in danger in earlier decades from the Soviet Empire during the
Cold War.46
As mentioned earlier, the Iraqi crisis culminated in the Atlantic Summit of the
Azores Islands, where Bush, Blair, and Aznar issued an unprecedented ultimatum to
the UN Security Council members, demanding them to assume their responsibility
to pass a new resolution in accordance to the Spanish-Anglo-American proposal.
This summit was a clear challenge to the international legitimacy of the Security
Council and a demonstration of the unilateral will of the US and its allies.
Taking stock of this time, it is true that Aznar’s foreign
policy improved the Spanish-American relationship to an
unprecedented extent, but it is also necessary to
remember that he did it by supporting an illegal war with
Iraq, a decision based on spurious suppositions and
exaggerations.
The alignment of Spanish foreign policy with US positions was, not only in
relation to the war in Iraq, but also the Spanish perspective of Latin America and the
Middle East conflict. At the end of his term, Aznar gave up Spanish neutrality in this
conflict. In fact, Aznar accused Palestinian terrorism of being the main cause of the
conflict and accused the terrorists of being the most detrimental obstacle to reaching
a peace agreement. In addition, Aznar supported the political ostracism of Yassir
Arafat, impelled by the neoconservative ideas.47
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Regarding Latin America, Aznar substantially agreed with US policies toward
Cuba and Venezuela.48 Yet, Aznar’s position was misguided because it did not take
into account the particular ties and interests of Spain in these countries, giving rise
to a loss of political independence and moral authority across the region. The role
played by the Spanish government after the frustrated coup d’état in Venezuela of
April, 2001 has been especially controversial. It must be clear that Spain had in no
way organized nor supported the coup, though the Spanish Ambassador, together
with the American Ambassador in Caracas, were the only foreign representatives
who implicitly recognized Pedro Carmona as the new President.49 In this case, the
Spanish alignment with US positions reached an excessive point that put the
independence of Spanish foreign policy at risk.
One of the most serious consequences of Aznar’s Atlanticist foreign policy,
which entailed backing an illegal action under international law, was the damage to
the international image of Spain as a peace-loving state that respects international
law. Prior to Aznar’s actions, Spain was strongly committed to the collective security
system that is legitimately represented by the UN Security Council.50
Spain had no significant military resources to contribute to the Anglo-American
coalition; therefore, Spain’s influence during the Iraq crisis was minimal. In fact, the
only country that was able to influence US decision making was Great Britain,
because of their so-called “special relationship.” Coincidently, Tony Blair and Colin
Powell had the same perspectives about the role of the UN Security Council in the
management of the conflict. As a middle power, Spain could not contribute troops
to the military action against Iraq, but instead sent two ships filled with medical
equipment. In this respect, the strong political support given to the Anglo-American
invasion of Iraq contrasted sharply with the meager military contribution made by
the Spanish government. This was a clear demonstration that the political will of
Spain was not proportional with its economic means and military capabilities. The
proportionality between means and goals must be the basis of a serious and well-
balanced foreign policy. On the contrary, carrying out a disproportional foreign
policy generates false expectations and harms the country’s international credibility.
In this respect, the above-mentioned Atlantic Summit held in the Azores was a
paradigm of lack of proportionality between political goals and military means. With
a conspicuous lack of realism, Aznar tried to demonstrate that Madrid was deciding
the course of international politics together with Washington and London.
According to Aznar’s viewpoint, the Atlantic Summit was a qualitative jump for
Spain, a turning point in achieving a new international status; yet, a critical analysis
allows for the recognition that this was more of a mirage than a reality, as the political
will for greatness is not enough to create a great power per se.
In the most unilateral moments of President Bush’s first term, the US treated its
friends—maybe with the sole exception of the United Kingdom—more like vassals
than genuine allies. Bush simply informed his friends about US decisions, expecting
unconditional adhesion. In a strong relationship between allies, the highest level in
the decision-making process is joint decision making. Taking into account the
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military décalage between the US and its allies, joint decision making is arguably
unrealistic and exaggerated, but given the critical international circumstances, the US
administration should have at least consulted its allies before pursuing important
policy prescriptions.
Taking stock of this time, it is true that Aznar’s foreign policy improved the
Spanish-American relationship to an unprecedented extent, but it is also necessary to
remember that he did it by supporting an illegal war with Iraq; a decision based on
spurious suppositions and exaggerations. Since its return to democracy in 1978,
Spanish foreign policy has been characterized by the respect of international law and
international cooperation through multilateral institutions. This feature has been
empowered by the Spanish membership in the European Communities, culminating
with being one of the most definitive values of Spanish foreign policy.
According to the unilateralist nature of the foreign policy carried out by Aznar
in his last two years in office, it was condemned to be ephemeral. Aznar gave up the
aspirations of constructing a foreign policy based on consensus, consequently
making the formulation of a long-lasting foreign policy almost impossible. Even if
his successor in the Popular Party and Prime Minister candidate, Mariano Rajoy, had
won the 2004 elections, he probably would have had to alter the foreign policy of
Spain by looking for a more balanced perspective. As we are going to see in the next
section, the victory of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero will hurry the changes in
Spanish foreign policy, but without giving stability to it.
THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF JOSÉ LUIS RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO
(2004–2006): A DOUBTFUL FOREIGN POLICY
In order to understand the current distancing between Spain and the US, it is
necessary to take into account the following factors, namely: it began from an
anomalous situation in which Aznar broke the existing consensus through his drastic
foreign policies, and the new Spanish government’s lack of international experience,
as well as its vague conception of foreign affairs.
Effectively, the relationship between Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero and
President Bush began at a very complicated point. The new prime minister of Spain
had promised his constituency the withdrawal of troops from Iraqi soil in
conformity with his total opposition to the invasion of Iraq. The Aznar foreign
policy was simply untenable for the new government, and the relationship with the
US was destined to deteriorate, to a certain extent. However, the strain in the
relationship between both states has not been well managed by the Spanish
government, consequently increasing the damages with a series of unfortunate acts.
Moreover, the Bush Administration, and specifically its neoconservative
advisers, has shown little tolerance for criticism from its allies. During these years, it
has proven very difficult to deal with an administration that has implemented a
foreign policy based on an assertive, unilateral will, a state of affairs especially
exacerbated during Bush’s first term. According to neoconservatives’ moral
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absolutism, the political disagreement is comparable to treason, and critical allies are
seen as treacherous.51
This delicate situation was aggravated by the inappropriate management of the
Spanish government. In fact, Rodríguez Zapatero’s first mistake was made before he
became prime minister of Spain. On the National Day of Spain, October 12, 2003,
he remained seated as the American flag passed by during the parade, which was
considered an offensive act by the US government. The following year, when
Rodríguez Zapatero was already the prime minister, George Argyros—former US
Ambassador in Madrid—refused to participate in the celebration.52 It is possible that
Rodríguez Zapatero did not seek to offend the American symbol, because his act was
a protest against the position held by Aznar’s government and, in this respect, was
primarily a domestic affair. Regardless, his actions were not suitable of a candidate
for prime minister, who must always respect the fundamental rules of diplomatic
courtesy.
The withdrawal of troops, a sovereign right of any state, could have been carried
out in better conjunction with the American Command in Iraq. Yet, the withdrawal
was carried out quickly; two months before the foreseen date,53 because the Spanish
government decided not to wait until the new UN Security Council resolution in
order to avoid the pressures from Washington.54 Nevertheless, it is clear that more
prudent decision making and execution of the withdrawal would have irritated the
Pentagon less and it would have reduced the political cost of this decision.55
A few months after the withdrawal of Spanish troops, on September 10, 2004,
Rodríguez Zapatero travelled to Tunisia and stated that every country should follow
the example of Spain.56 Obviously, Spain had the right to withdraw its troops, but
this declaration seemed like a public invitation to desertion. Unquestionably, this was
an erroneous declaration that fed the accusations of betrayal, showing the lack of
international experience of the new prime minister. During the US presidential
campaign in October, 2004, Prime Minister Rodríguez Zapatero made another
clamorous strategic mistake by publicly expressing his preference for John Kerry
over George W. Bush.57 This was unwise and un-diplomatic as it set to strain the
relationship with the White House for the next four years, especially as President
Bush was re-elected.
Together, with the previously mentioned mistakes, the appointment of Miguel
Ángel Moratinos—an experienced diplomat who served as EU special envoy for the
Middle East peace process for seven years—as minister of foreign affairs of Spain
has not been beneficial for reconstructing the relationship with the US. From the
perspective of the neoconservatives, Moratinos was a pro-Palestinian politician, an
unfair accusation as he has always maintained a neutral approach in the Middle East
conflict.58 From the neoconservative defensive position, anyone that holds a neutral
point of view toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is immediately accused of being
pro-Palestinian.59
Moreover, the new relationship between Spain and Venezuela, as well as Spain’s
new policy toward Cuba, have further irritated the Bush administration. Concerning
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Hugo Chávez, the current Spanish government has shown a lack of political ability
and international inexperience by giving him an excessive personal prominence in
several high level summits. The Spanish neoconservatives have taken advantage of
this fact, asserting that Castro and Chávez are the main allies of Spain in the region
in an attempt to accuse the government as radical and anti-American.60
Furthermore, the sale of armaments to Venezuela has caused tensions between
Madrid and Washington, because the aircrafts that Spain planned to sell to Venezuela
had American technological equipment. The current American ambassador in
Madrid, Eduardo Aguirre, warned the Spanish government that the US would not
agree with the sale.61 Eventually, the US vetoed the sale of twelve aircraft with
Americans components.62 According to American and Spanish neoconservatives,
Chavez’s regime is practically the same as Castro’s.63 To equate both regimes’ nature
is simply wrong, as it does not take into account the different political, juridical, and
historical circumstances of each country. And it is cynical as well, because the US
keeps its commercial relations with Caracas, despite Chavez’s anti-American
discourse.64
In spite of his anti-Americanism, as well as his absolute lack of diplomatic
courtesy, Chávez has been elected several times by the means of free and democratic
elections, as the OAS, the EU electoral observers, and the Carter Foundation have
confirmed.65 As such, he is the legitimate representative of Venezuela, and it is
necessary to continue dialogue with him, instead of seeking his removal. In any case,
the Spanish government, and the European Union, must be more assertive with
Caracas on such issues as rule of law and civil rights. Both Spain and the EU are
committed to democracy and good governance in Latin America and, therefore,
must watch attentively the political course of the region.
One must take into account that Spain has strong cultural and historical ties with
Venezuela and Cuba, as well as important economic interests in both countries.
Consequently, having a foreign policy in these countries that follows US guidelines is
far from optimal. The hard-line policy of isolating Cuba, held by the US throughout
the last fifty years, not only failed to weaken Castro’s regime, but has only increased
the suffering of the Cuban people. Paradoxically, as the past decades have shown, a
more flexible policy of dialogue with Havana would not open the regime towards the
democratic path, but at the very least, contact with the outside world would serve to
mitigate the hardship of the Cuban people.66 Differences between Cuba and
Venezuela must be taken into account, in order to demand proper democratic
advances from each regime.
Rodríguez Zapatero has formulated a new foreign policy, which has rejected the
main lines of the model proposed by Aznar in his last two years as primer minister.
Likewise, Rodríguez Zapatero’s model has generated tensions with the US
administration in several fields, without placating the domestic disputes concerning
Spanish foreign policy. Therefore, it would be advisable to carry out some
rectifications in the close future without waiting until the elections of March, 2008.
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CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A NEW CONSENSUS IN FOREIGN POLICY
It is obvious that Zapatero will never be able to reach the level of understanding
that Aznar had with Bush, but he should make all necessary efforts to achieve a well-
balanced relationship. This does not mean that the Spanish government must give up
its ideals, but it has to at least avoid hostile gestures toward the US administration.
The international vision of Rodríguez Zapatero is different from Bush’s vision,
but it is clearly not anti-American. That US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has
given her support to the “Alliance of Civilizations,”67 proposed by the Spanish and
Turkish governments and endorsed by the United Nations, serves as a good example.
It is very likely that the Bush administration and the Spanish government have
different interpretations of this Alliance. While the US Department of State is
interested in the aspects concerning Middle East democracy promotion, the Spanish
government is focused on cultural dialogue and poverty, in order to fight against
terrorism.68 Nevertheless, this initiative represents an opportunity for dialogue
between both countries, which should be seized in order to leave aside the
differences over Iraq.
In effect, the current government in Spain does not believe the change-of-
regime doctrine is a valid way of spreading democracy in the Middle East and across
the Muslim world.69 This approach is not proactive, and it has incited
neoconservative criticism, asserting that it endorses the option of appeasement,
comparing it with the Munich Conference of 1938, an idée fixe of the
neoconservative ideology.70 This charge must be rejected because the Spanish
government is firmly committed to fighting global terrorism, but it does not share
the militarist approach of the Bush administration on this matter. The Spanish anti-
terrorist perspective is based on the multilateral approach of the conference held in
Madrid in March, 2005, under the sponsorship of the UN.71 Bush’s war on terrorism,
conceived as a new World War, has the serious shortcoming of being an interstate
war that does not take into account the transnational and asymmetrical nature of
global terrorism.72 The scarce success,73 if not failure, of the Bush doctrine in terms
of terrorism is due in part to this misconception. Yet, at the same time, it is a
consequence of the substantial incompatibility between the fight against terrorism
and the implementation of the neoconservative hegemonic agenda.74
Thus, one must recognize that Spain and the US do not currently share the
same vision of the world. The easiest solution for the Spanish government would be
to wait until Bush’s retirement, hoping for a more receptive US president and
administration to Spanish foreign policy. At the same, the Spanish government has
to take into account the changes in the US cabinet and the probable revision of
policies that would take place in Washington, which may allow for an opportunity to
reconcile the relationship. The present situation in Iraq, and the consequent crisis of
credibility of the current policy towards the region, have weakened the hawkish
positions of the Bush administration, which gives an opportunity to a new
approach.75 Because of the disastrous post-war period in Iraq, the neoconservatives
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have lost much of their political influence on decision making, which they had
during the first term. Therefore, US foreign policy has decreased its high degree of
unilateralism.76
A meeting between Zapatero and Bush would be necessary for normalizing the
Spanish-American relationship after three years of distancing, which has created a
relative, mutual distrust. Yet, this must not be specifically a goal in itself, but a result
of preceding rapprochement.77 As the Spanish participation in peacekeeping
operations in Afghanistan and Lebanon has demonstrated, there are several issues
within international relations that generate understanding, cooperation, and mutual
respect between the two countries.78 Spain will always support the American
initiatives that are developed within the framework of NATO, and under the
protection of the UN. In the bilateral field, the Spanish-American Military
Agreements are in force, and the Spanish government will fully respect its
commitments. Regardless of the political discrepancies, the basis of the Spanish-
American friendship has never been questioned. With the remarkable exception of
divergent policies in both countries toward the unilateral and preventive use of force
in Iraq, the US government has Spain as a reliable ally. It is time to put aside the
differences over the war in Iraq and look to the future.
In general terms, the main failure of the Zapatero foreign policy has been its
inability to reconstruct the bipartisan consensus; arguably, the Spanish-American
relationship is the main cause of this matter. Therefore, the key point, necessary to
normalize the Spanish-US relationship, lies in domestic policy. In order to normalize
the relationship with the US once again, Spanish political parties must first improve
the political consensus among them. The Spanish prime minister should work to
create a new common and shared foreign policy, redefining the Spanish-American
relationship, in such terms that both central Spanish political parties can accept. The
Socialist Party and the Popular Party will have to overcome the confrontation
concerning the Iraqi war, and look for new ways Spain can contribute to tackle the
present international challenges.
It is not possible to return to the old consensus because the international
environment is not the same as the beginning of the decade. For that reason, there
is need to create a new consensus, which takes into account the strategic priorities
and necessities of the post-9/11 world. In order to achieve this new consensus,
which is balanced with the European orientation of Spain, it is essential to achieve
an agreement, concerning the US, in Spanish foreign policy. Neither the
neoconservative, staunch Atlanticism, nor leftist anti-American inclinations, will be
able to create a new consensus; therefore, it will be essential to find a common space
of understanding and agreement in the relationship with the US somewhere between
both extremes. This new approach could be based on less ideological and more
pragmatic tenets. The US is an essential ally with which it is necessary to have a
friendly relationship; but it is also important to bear in mind that loyalty must not be
confused with obedience. Furthermore, criticism must be constructive and based on
specific aspects, and not in mere ideological prejudices.
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The momentous swings of Spanish foreign policy have harmed the credibility
of Spain as a reliable actor in the international community. To repair this damage,
Spanish foreign policy must be based upon an agreement between the main political
parties. Political unity is a desirable basis in the formation of prescriptions for the
creation of an effective foreign policy that defends Spain’s nationalist interests. A
foreign policy conceived from a true engagement of society and goverment is
imperative to providing policies with the necessary continuity and long term
perspective to prove beneficial to Spain and its people.
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